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In most west European countries, workers historically have enjoyed strong job
rights, including the right to advance notice of layoff and the right to severance
pay or to negotiations over compensation for layoff. During the 1970s, on the
eve of the first oil price shock, many of these countries significantly strength-
ened the notice and severance pay requirements imposed on employers who
carried out collective dismissals. Particularly following the rapid growth in
European unemployment during the late 1970s and early 1980s, these laws
came under attack, and many were weakened over the course of the 1980s.
The question of whether and to what extent job-security regulations ad-
versely affect labor market flexibility remains a matter of continuing contro-
versy. Critics have claimed that strong job rights prevent employers from ad-
justing to economic fluctuations and secular changes in demand. It has also
been alleged that, by inhibiting layoffs during downturns, strong job-security
provisions reduce employers' willingness to hire during upturns and thereby
contribute to unemployment.
1
In fact, the effects of job-security regulations on labor market adjustment
are poorly understood. Although such regulations would be expected to slow
the adjustment of employment to an unexpected shock, the magnitude of this
effect is debatable. Moreover, strong job-security regulations typically have
been accompanied by measures intended to facilitate alternatives to layoffs,
such as work-sharing. Whether and to what extent variation in working hours
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1. For an elaboration of these arguments, see OECD (1986) and Soltwedel (1988).
5960 Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman
offers employers a viable substitute to adjustment through layoffs remains an
open question.
In this paper we provide new evidence on these issues. We compare the
adjustment of employment to changing levels of demand in West Germany,
France, and Belgium (all countries with strong job-security regulations) with
that in the United States. Insofar as is possible with existing data, we also
examine the responsiveness of hours worked to changes in the level of output
in each of these countries. Finally, we ask whether changes in the strength of
German, French, and Belgian job-security regulations during the 1970s and
1980s were associated with corresponding changes in the speed of employ-
ment or hours adjustment.
We begin in section 3.1 with a discussion of selected features of the West
German, French, and Belgian industrial relations systems, focusing on job-
security regulations and on measures intended to encourage work-sharing. For
purposes of comparison, relevant U.S. institutions are also described. Our
modeling strategy and data are briefly outlined in section 3.2. Section 3.3 doc-
uments the responsiveness of employment and, where possible, the respon-
siveness of hours to changes in output in the countries studied. Section 3.4
contains our tests of the effects of changes in job-security law on observed
adjustment, and section 3.5 offers a few concluding observations.
3.1 Institutional Background
Many features of a country's industrial relations system may affect employ-
ers' adjustment decisions. Among the most noteworthy are regulations that
impose notice and severance pay requirements on employers who dismiss
workers, and measures that encourage hours adjustment in lieu of layoffs. Like
most other west European countries, Germany, France, and Belgium all impose
significant notice and severance pay requirements on employers who lay off
workers. The most important features of these countries' job-security regula-
tions are summarized in table 3.1. In addition, as outlined in table 3.2, all three
countries have unemployment insurance systems that allow for prorated re-
placement of lost income for workers whose hours have been reduced as part
of an approved short-time plan.
Like other west European countries, West Germany, France, and Belgium
tightened their job-security regulations during the 1970s, then weakened them
in one or more important ways during the 1980s. All three countries experi-
enced substantial increases in unemployment during the late 1970s and early
1980s. Thus, tighter job-security regulations were associated with subsequent
increases in unemployment. In each country, the relaxation of job-security reg-
ulations during the 1980s reflected pressure from employer groups who argued
that existing regulations were unduly restrictive and that weakening those regu-
lations would increase employment.
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many, France, and Belgium and relevant aspects of each country's unemploy-
ment insurance system. These countries' policies are then contrasted with
those in the United States.
3.1.1 Germany
The first law requiring German employers to give advance notice of dis-
missal to individual workers was passed during the 1920s. Today, required pe-
riods of notice to individual workers in Germany vary from two weeks to six
months, depending upon whether the worker holds a blue-collar or a white-
collar job and upon his or her seniority and age.
2
In addition to stipulating advance notice for individual workers, German law
gives the works council a legally mandated body of elected worker representa-
tives, important powers in the event of a collective dismissal. Under current
law, employers must keep both the works council and the local employment
office advised of any developments that might lead to a collective dismissal
over the next twelve months, and must consult the works council "as soon as
possible" when contemplating such a layoff. The most important provision of
the current law was introduced by the Works Constitution Act of 1972. That
law requires, in cases of collective dismissal at an establishment normally em-
ploying more than twenty employees, that management and the works council
must negotiate a social plan that stipulates compensation for workers who lose
their jobs. In the event that the two parties cannot agree on a social plan, the
law provides for binding arbitration.
Settlements in social plans vary considerably from case to case and depend
upon the worker's tenure and wage as well as the company's financial condi-
tion. A study by Hemmer (1988) provides the best available data on the
amounts of compensation paid out. In a sample of 145 social plans negotiated
between 1980 and 1985, the median settlement was between DM 10,000 and
DM 15,000 per recipient, or about fifteen to twenty-five weeks pay for a person
with average blue-collar industrial earnings.
Between 1972 and 1985, the negotiation of a social plan was required if an
employer laid off more than about 10 percent of the work force or more than
thirty workers. The Employment Promotion Act of 1985 raised these thresh-
olds to about 20 percent of the work force or more than sixty workers and gave
new firms a four-year exemption from the social plan requirement. In addition,
the new law made it easier for employers to hire workers on fixed-term con-
tracts. German law regulates the use of fixed-term contracts so that employers
cannot evade job-security regulations by hiring temporary workers who do not
fall under the law's strictures. Prior to 1985, fixed-term contracts could last for
no more than six months except under special circumstances. The 1985 law
2. A 1990 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, the highest German court, declared the
disparate treatment of blue-collar and white-collar workers under these statutes to be unconstitu-
tional. This decision instructed the parliament to pass new legislation providing for equal notice
periods for the two groups prior to June 30, 1993 (Brandes, Meyer, and Schudlich 1992, 22-23).65 Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?
lengthened the allowable duration of fixed-term contracts to eighteen months
and to twenty-four months for new small businesses.
German workers who are laid off are eligible to collect unemployment insur-
ance benefits. The payroll tax that finances these benefits is not experience-
rated, so that German employers incur no increase in unemployment insurance
tax liability when they lay off workers. Because of the advance notice and
other requirements associated with collective dismissals, temporary layoffs are
virtually unknown in Germany, but the German unemployment insurance sys-
tem does provide for short-time benefits. With the approval of the works coun-
cil and the Employment Service, firms can reduce employees' hours of work,
and those employees can collect prorated unemployment insurance benefits,
which are financed in the same way as benefits to laid-off workers. Firms
applying for short-time benefits must show that other measures for accommo-
dating the fall in demand, such as reductions in overtime and rebuilding inven-
tories, have already been taken. Since 1969, short-time benefits have been pay-
able for six months under ordinary circumstances and for up to twelve months
to employees of establishments in depressed regions or industries. In 1975 the
allowable duration of benefit payment was extended to twenty-four months
during periods of general recession.
3
3.1.2 France
As in Germany, the requirement that workers be given advance notice of
layoff has a long history in France. Under current law, the required period of
notice is one month for workers with at least six months' service, two months
for workers with at least two years' service, and three months for persons in
middle management positions. French law also provides for severance pay-
ments to workers with at least two years' service who have not been fired for
poor performance or other serious cause. The amount of severance pay guaran-
teed by law is one-tenth of one month's salary or twenty hours' pay for each
year of service, though these amounts may be increased by the terms of appli-
cable collective bargaining agreements.
French employers are required to meet additional legal requirements before
carrying out collective dismissals involving as few as two workers over a thirty-
day period. Before carrying out any such layoff, the employer is obliged to
consult with the works council and advise the Labor Inspectorate of its plans.
If ten or more workers are to be laid off, the law provides for minimum periods
of consultation with the works council and notice to the Labor Inspectorate.
The most important changes to French labor law in recent years relate to
these requirements. From 1975 through 1986, employers who wished to carry
out any collective dismissal were required to obtain authorization from the
Labor Inspectorate, which investigated both the reasons for the dismissal and
the measures taken to avoid it. New rules effective as of 1987, however, have
3. For a more detailed discussion of German institutions, see Abraham and Houseman (1993).66 Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman
eliminated this requirement. The same reform also eliminated all administra-
tive oversight of layoffs involving fewer than ten employees and substantially
reduced required periods of notice for larger layoffs.
4
Like Germany, France also has a well-established structure for paying bene-
fits to individuals whose hours of work have been temporarily reduced. The
French system includes two types of payment, one from the state and the sec-
ond from the employer under the terms of a 1968 national interindustry
agreement. The former payment may be received except when workers are
idled by an industrial dispute at their own establishment; the latter is not pay-
able to workers idled by any industrial dispute. The public payment is a fixed
hourly amount equal to 65 percent of the minimum wage for reductions in
hours below thirty-nine per week. The complementary employer payment
raises the short-time benefit to 50 percent of the worker's gross wage for reduc-
tions in hours below thirty-six per week, subject to a ceiling. Benefits currently
may be paid for up to five hundred hours per year.
To encourage the use of short time, employers may be reimbursed for be-
tween 50 and 80 percent of their share of workers' short-time benefits. In prac-
tice, reimbursement rates of 70 to 80 percent are common. Agreements be-
tween an employer and the state concerning reimbursement of the employer's
share of short-time benefit costs may last three months when the reimburse-
ment rate is 70 percent or more, or six months when the reimbursement rate is
50 percent, with the possibility in both cases of one extension for a like term.
5
3.1.3 Belgium
Like German and French employers, Belgian employers are required to give
advance notice of dismissal to affected workers. For blue-collar workers past
their probationary period, the notice period is twenty-eight days for workers
with less than twenty years of service and fifty-six days for workers with more
than twenty years of service. Since 1978, much longer notice periods have been
required for white-collar workers, starting with a minimum of three months for
those with less than five years of service and rising by three months for each
successive five-year anniversary attained. In addition, highly paid white-collar
workers were given the right to an amount of notice to be determined by the
labor court. Subsequent court rulings effectively guaranteed these workers
substantially longer notice periods.
Belgian law specifies no mandatory compensation to workers who are indi-
vidually dismissed beyond the amount they are paid while serving out their
period of notice. Belgian workers involved in a collective dismissal are entitled
to special compensation from their employer in the amount of 50 percent of
the difference between their previous net pay and their unemployment benefit
4. For discussions of French dismissal law and its evolution over time, see Rojot (1980, 1986)
and EIRR (1985a, 1986).
5. For additional information on the French short-time system, see Grais (1983) and EIRR
(1983). We have also benefited from conversations about the system with David Gray of the Uni-
versity of Ottawa.67 Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?
or current net earnings. Workers who received less than three months' notice
are entitled to receive this special payment for up to four months; the period
of entitlement is reduced by one month for each extra month of notice received.
Belgian law also contains special provisions for compensation to workers who
lose their jobs because their plant closes.
In contrast to both German and French law, Belgian law does not require
employers to justify dismissals. A law passed in 1972, however, requires that
worker representatives be consulted before an employer carries out a collective
dismissal. In addition, under the terms of a 1975 royal decree, which took
effect in 1976, companies are required to provide detailed information to the
state in the event of a planned layoff and to wait for at least thirty days after
submitting this information before notifying affected workers of their dis-
missal. The introduction of this requirement was an important milestone in the
development of Belgian labor law.
6
Although the requirements imposed on employers who lay off blue-collar
workers are less stringent in Belgium than in Germany and France, the growth
of unemployment in the 1980s led to pressure for measures to increase employ-
ment flexibility. In addition to reducing periods of notice for white-collar work-
ers, the reform package introduced in 1985 eased regulations concerning the
use of fixed-term contracts and made a number of other smaller but collectively
significant changes (EIRR 1984).
Among the three European countries we have studied, Belgium has the most
liberal rules governing payment of short-time benefits to production workers.
Production workers' short-time benefits are paid out of the regular unemploy-
ment insurance fund, which is financed by a payroll tax of a uniform percent-
age amount. Legislation that would have experience-rated the contributions
that pay for short-time compensation was introduced in 1991 but did not pass
(Vroman 1992, 22). Short-time compensation replaces 55 to 60 percent of a
worker's net wages, depending upon his or her family situation. The rules gov-
erning payment of short time are complex but allow a blue-collar worker to
collect short time indefinitely so long as he or she works a minimum of three
days per week, or every other week if on a system of rotating layoffs, and the
government does not disapprove the payment. Belgian white-collar workers




The requirements governing layoffs and the provision for short-time benefits
described above offer a significant contrast to the general absence of similar
arrangements in the United States. Prior to 1988, advance notice of layoffs and
6. Further details concerning Belgian dismissal law can be found in EIRR (1985b), Vranken
(1986), and Blanpain (1989).
7. See Grais (1983), EIRR (1983), and Vroman (1992) for further discussion of the Belgian
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plant closings was required in only three states: Maine, Wisconsin, and Hawaii.
In the absence of any national law requiring advance notice, workers often
received little or no warning prior to being let go. In addition, workers who are
permanently laid off often receive no severance pay.
8
Although U.S. employers are not required to make severance payments to
laid-off workers, the fact that the U.S. unemployment insurance system is
experience-rated means that layoffs may lead to an increase in unemployment
insurance tax liability. For a U.S. employer, the effective unemployment insur-
ance cost of laying off a worker depends upon three things: his or her weekly
benefit amount, the duration of benefit receipt, and the share of the benefit for
which the employer ultimately pays through higher unemployment insurance
taxes. Weekly benefit amounts average roughly 35 percent of weekly wages;
the average duration of benefit receipt varies somewhat over the business cycle
but has averaged about fourteen weeks; and, at the margin, a typical employer
bears about 60 percent of the cost of benefits paid to laid-off workers (though
many employers are already paying the maximum unemployment insurance
tax rate and thus incur no increase in costs if they lay off additional workers).
9
Thus, a rough estimate of the unemployment insurance cost to a typical em-
ployer of laying off another worker is about three weeks' wages in the form of
increased unemployment insurance tax liability.
Paying unemployment insurance benefits to workers whose hours have been
reduced is a recent innovation in the United States. At present, only seventeen
states have laws allowing prorated payment of unemployment insurance bene-
fits to workers whose hours are reduced under approved work-sharing plans,
and most of these laws were passed quite recently.
3.1.5 Implications for Labor Adjustment
Because of the institutional features of the German, French, and Belgian
labor markets, we would expect that employers in these countries would re-
spond quite differently to changes in production than would their U.S. counter-
parts. The advance notice and severance pay requirements that exist in all three
countries can be expected to slow the adjustment of employment to changes in
output. Given that mass layoffs are relatively costly in all of the European
countries included in our study, we would expect greater reliance on attrition
to achieve desired work force reductions there than in the United States.
While we would expect the adjustment of employment to be slower in these
European countries than in the United States, we would not necessarily expect
slower adjustment of total labor input. High employment adjustment costs
should increase employers' reliance on hours adjustments. In addition, the
8. See General Accounting Office (1986) for survey results on the incidence of advance notice
and severance pay.
9. Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, published by the U.S. Department of Labor, con-
tains data on weekly benefit amounts, weekly wages in covered employment, and the duration of
benefit receipt. Vroman (1989) discusses alternative estimates of the degree of experience rating.69 Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?
availability of short-time compensation makes it less costly to adjust average
hours per worker.
1
0 A priori, it is unclear whether German, French, and Belgian
employers are, in fact, less able than U.S. employers to adjust labor input to
changes in demand. Our empirical analysis looks at this question.
A final issue of interest is whether changes during the 1970s and 1980s to
the job-security regulations in each of the three European countries studied
affected the speed with which labor input adjusted to changes in output.
3.2 Model and Data
We have used a standard Koyck model of the dynamic demand for labor to
study labor adjustment in West Germany, France, Belgium and the United
States. The model assumes that employers seek to maximize the expected pres-
ent value of current and future profits; that the costs of adjusting labor input
are a quadratic function of the size of the adjustment made; and that changes
in the determinants of the demand for labor other than output are sufficiently
smooth that they can be captured by time trends. Under these conditions and
given certain assumptions about how employers form their expectations of fu-
ture demand, the adjustment of labor to changes in the level of output can be
represented by the following equation:
(1) lnL, = a + (1 - \)<|> lnP, + XlnL,_, + 8,/ + 8/ + e,,
where L represents employment, production employment, or production hours,
P represents output, tis a time trend, and e is the equation error. In this model,
the parameter X lies between zero and one and captures the speed of adjust-
ment to changes in output. Larger values of \ are associated with slower ad-
justment speeds. A value of zero for X implies that adjustment occurs instanta-
neously.
Note that, in interpreting cross-country differences in the estimated value of
X, a given difference in X implies a larger difference in the speed of adjustment
to a shock at high than at low values of X. In the model specified, the proportion
of the adjustment of labor input to a one-time change in output that occurs
with a lag of t periods declines geometrically with t and equals (1 — X)X'. The
median lag in adjustment is the time required for 50 percent of the adjustment
to be complete. In an equation using quarterly data, a drop in the estimated
value of X from 0.9 to 0.8 would imply a sizable drop in the median adjustment
10. Formal models of the effects of employment adjustment costs on both employment and
hours are surveyed by Nickell (1986) and Hamermesh (1993). Burdett and Wright (1989) model
the effect of access to short-time compensation through the unemployment insurance system. In
their model, the short-time compensation subsidy associated with imperfect experience rating in-
creases employers' reliance on hours adjustments and raises the volatility of average hours relative
to the volatility of employment. Even in a perfectly experience-rated unemployment insurance
system, giving liquidity-constrained employers access to short-time benefits for their workers may
produce the same result.70 Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman
lag, from 6 to 3 quarters. For values of X of 0.5 or less, half or more of the
adjustment to an output shock occurs concurrently, so that the median adjust-
ment lag is zero quarters. Thus, a reduction in X from, say, 0.4 to 0.3 would
have no effect on the median adjustment lag. The mean lag in adjustment,
which is the weighted average of the lag lengths t — 0,1,2 ... °° with the
weight for each t equal to the share of adjustment occurring at that lag, is
calculated as X/(l — \) (Maddala 1977, 360). A drop in the estimated value of
X from 0.9 to 0.8 would imply a drop in the mean adjustment lag from 9.0 to
4.0 quarters, whereas a decline in X from 0.4 to 0.3 would imply a much
smaller decline in the mean adjustment lag, from 0.7 to 0.4 quarters. When we
report estimated values of X for the purpose of making cross-country compari-
sons, we also report the values of the implied median lag and mean lag in ad-
justment.
Our specification treats output as exogenous. This assumption might be
questioned, but as a practical matter there is no real alternative. Our model also
assumes that the costs of adjusting labor input are a quadratic function of its
change. Although the true structure of adjustment costs has been widely de-
bated in the economics profession, we would expect larger adjustment costs
(whatever their structure) to produce less-complete adjustment.
1
1 Moreover, al-
though the model we have estimated was originally developed to explain the
behavior of individual employers, larger adjustment costs should produce
larger values of X in models estimated using aggregate data, all else the
same.
Finally, our specification assumes that information on current output is suf-
ficient to generate employers' expectations concerning future output. In earlier
work (Abraham and Houseman 1992), we found that making more complex
assumptions about output expectations had little effect on the relative esti-
mated speeds of adjustment across countries. We also have estimated finite
distributed lag models of the labor adjustment process and reached qualitative
conclusions generally similar to those based on the models reported here. In
short, although there are certainly questions that could be raised concerning
our model specification, we believe both that our choice is defensible and that
our qualitative conclusions would not have been much different had we made
a different choice.
We use equation (1) or a variant of it to assess the contribution of short-time
work to observed labor adjustment and to assess the effect of changes in labor
market regulation on the speed with which labor inputs are adjusted.
1
2 In all
11. For example, if adjustment costs are linear and there are periods during which firms choose
not to hire or fire, then A. should approximately equal the fraction of periods during which no
hiring or firing occurs, and that fraction should be larger when adjustment costs are higher (Ander-
son 1992). Similarly, the existence of fixed costs of adjustment should reduce the probability that
a firm will adjust its labor input when output changes and should raise the estimated value of X
(Hamermesh 1989).
12. We also tested for differences in the speed of labor adjustment in response to negative
versus positive output shocks. The differences, however, were always very small and generally
statistically insignificant, and we do not report the results of this exercise.71 Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?
models where Durbin-/? tests indicated that there was first-order serial correla-
tion in the error term, we made the appropriate correction.
Seasonally adjusted quarterly series for the West German, French, and Bel-
gian manufacturing sectors and for selected manufacturing industries in those
countries are used to estimate the models just described. Comparable estimates
for the United States are also reported for purposes of comparison. Usable data
on production employment and production hours are not available for France.
Our principal measure of output for all four countries is an index of industrial
production. We also make use of data on short-time hours for West Germany,
France, and Belgium. Further details concerning data sources and construction
are provided in the appendix.
3.3 Patterns of Labor Adjustment
The first part of our empirical analysis looks at the adjustment of employ-
ment and hours to changes in output over the 1973-90 period taken as a whole.
In addition, we examine the contribution of the short-time system to labor ad-
justment in West Germany, France, and Belgium.
3.3.1 Employment and Hours Adjustment
Before turning to the estimation of formal adjustment models, we begin by
examining plots of production, production worker employment, and produc-
tion worker hours indices for West Germany, Belgium, and the United States.
1
3
Figure 3.1 displays these plots for the manufacturing sector as a whole and for
the textiles; apparel; stone, clay, and glass; primary metals; automobiles; paper;
printing; and chemicals industries. These industries were selected for inclusion
both here and in the estimation reported below because there was a close corre-
lation between the European and U.S. industry definition and because at least
some usable time series data were available for at least two European countries.
There are no plots of French data in figure 3.1 because suitable production
employment and production hours series for France do not exist.
Consistent with our expectations, production employment in West Germany
and Belgium moves smoothly and is unresponsive to short-run changes in out-
put, whereas in the United States, movements in production employment
closely follow those in output. In contrast, in both West Germany and Belgium,
production hours—and by implication average hours per production worker—
generally appear quite responsive to output changes, and German and Belgian
hours adjustment appears to be much more similar to U.S. hours adjustment
than German and Belgian employment adjustment is to U.S. employment ad-
justment.
Table 3.3 reports the estimated adjustment coefficients from Koyck models
of employment, production employment, and production hours adjustment fit
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Table 3.3 Estimated Speed of Adjustment in Manufacturing in the United








































































































































































































































































































































"The speed of adjustment parameter is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable from the
following Koyck model: lnL, = a + (1 - X^lnP, + \lnL,_, + 8,f + 5/ + e,, where L represents
employment, production employment, or production hours and P is a measure of output.79 Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?
Table 3.3 (continued)
bThe standard error of the estimated adjustment parameter is reported in parentheses, and the
implied median, mean adjustment lag in brackets.
'Estimates use production indices as the measure of output.
dEstimates use deflated shipments as the measure of output.
for West Germany, France, Belgium, and the United States, as permitted by
available data. In the employment adjustment models reported in panel A of
table 3.3, the differences between the estimated European adjustment coeffi-
cients and those for the United States are uniformly large and statistically sig-
nificant. The larger European coefficients imply that employment adjustment
there is substantially slower than in the United States. In manufacturing as a
whole, for example, the implied median lag is 3 quarters in Germany, 10 quar-
ters in France, and 3 quarters in Belgium, whereas over half (62 percent) of
the adjustment in the United States occurs in the current quarter. Similarly, the
mean adjustment lag is 5.1 quarters in Germany, 14.4 quarters in France, and
4.6 quarters in Belgium, but only 0.6 quarters in the United States. Consistent
with the plots in figure 3.1, the production employment models reported
in panel B of table 3.3 imply a similar contrast between the adjustment of pro-
duction employment in West Germany and Belgium and that in the United
States.
Our estimates of the speed of hours adjustment for West Germany, Belgium,
and the United States are reported in panel C of table 3.3. Comparison of the
German and U.S. coefficients shows that, for manufacturing as a whole and for
five of seven disaggregate industries, German hours adjustment is significantly
slower than U.S. hours adjustment. In all of these cases, however, the implied
difference in the speed of German and U.S. hours adjustment is much smaller
than the implied differences in the speeds of employment and production em-
ployment adjustment. For example, although they differ statistically, the Ger-
man and U.S. hours adjustment coefficients for the manufacturing sector as a
whole both imply a median adjustment lag of zero quarters and a mean adjust-
ment lag of less than one quarter. The hours adjustment results for West Ger-
many reported here are somewhat different than those we reported in an earlier
paper (Abraham and Houseman 1992). In our earlier work, we estimated ad-
justment equations for the 1974-84 period for each of eleven manufacturing
industries, using shipments deflated by a price index as our output measure.
The estimated German coefficients in these models were more similar to those
for the United States; for none of the eleven industries did we find evidence
that German hours adjustment was significantly slower than U.S. hours ad-
justment.
Although no single factor accounts for all of the differences, the use of pro-
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seems to be the most important. For purposes of comparison, we also report
the results of U.S. production hours adjustment models that use deflated ship-
ments as the measure of output. For all of manufacturing and for several disag-
gregated industries—apparel; stone, clay, and glass; automobiles; and chemi-
cals—the use of production rather than shipments as the measure of output
for the United States substantially reduces the estimated speed of adjustment
parameter, implying faster adjustment in the United States. Given that finished
goods inventories may be used to buffer against demand changes, we might
expect faster adjustment when production rather than shipments is used as the
measure of output. For aggregate manufacturing and automobiles, the drop in
the estimated coefficient for the United States also may be related to the way
the production index was constructed; for these two industries, production
hours account for 20 percent and 36 percent, respectively, of the production
index. The use of production hours in the construction of the production index
in these two cases would be expected to lower the estimated speed of adjust-
ment coefficient. For aggregate manufacturing and the auto industry, estimates
of hours adjustment in West Germany are quite similar to those in the United
States when deflated shipments are used as the measure of output for the
United States.
The results for Belgium in panel C of table 3.3 are even more similar to
those for the United States. For three of the six disaggregated industries for
which comparisons can be made, hours adjustment in Belgium is insignifi-
cantly different than that in the United States. In those industries where Bel-
gian hours adjustment is slower than U.S. hours adjustment, the implied mean
lag in Belgian adjustment is never more than one quarter longer than that in
the United States.
1
4 Our findings for Belgium are generally consistent with
those reported by Van Audenrode (1991), who, using a somewhat different
model and a different output measure, concluded that hours adjustment in Bel-
gian manufacturing was as rapid as that in U.S. manufacturing.
3.3.2 The Use of Short Time
It is of interest to ask how short-time work contributes to labor adjustment
in the European countries we study. The available data allow us to address this
question in somewhat different ways for West Germany, France, and Belgium.
For Germany, our general strategy is to ask how hours adjustment would
have differed had no workers been placed on short time, assuming that employ-
ers' adjustment behavior otherwise remained unchanged. Using data on the
number of manufacturing sector workers on short time and on the percentage
reduction in hours experienced by those workers, we constructed estimates of
the total number of production worker hours for which short-time compensa-
14. As in the United States, hours data are used in the construction of the Belgian production
indices for aggregate manufacturing and the auto industry, comprising about 15 percent of the
weight in each index.81 Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?
Table 3.4 Estimated Effects of Short Time on Adjustment in West German,
French, and Belgian Manufacturing, 1973-1990
Speed of Standard Median, Mean
Adjustment Error Adjustment Lag




























"The German and Belgian with-short-time coefficients are the estimated X's from the Koyck mod-
els with the logarithm of production hours as the dependent variable reported in table 3.3C. The
without-short-time coefficients are the estimated X's from similar models using the logarithm of
production hours plus short-time hours as the dependent variable.
The French without-short-time coefficient is slightly different from the estimated X from the
Koyck model with the logarithm of employment as the dependent variable reported in table 3.3A
because the French short-time series begins in 1973:4. The with-short-time coefficient is the esti-
mated X from a similar model using the logarithm of employment minus short-time days during
the quarter divided by 65 as the dependent variable.
tion was paid. The data on short time apply to all workers, not just production
workers. The reported estimates assume that only production workers work
short time, though the results are not much different if we assume that short-
time hours are distributed between production and nonproduction workers in
proportion to their share of total employment.
1
5
Using this series, it is possible to show the contribution of fluctuations in
short-time hours to the adjustment of production labor input. The results of
this exercise are reported in table 3.4. The "with short time" adjustment param-
eter is the same number as was reported in panel C of table 3.3; the "without
short time" number was derived by first constructing a total production hours
series equal to hours actually worked plus short-time hours, then estimating
our standard hours adjustment equation using this series. The results clearly
indicate that the short-time system plays an important role in German employ-
ers' adjustment of labor input to changes in output.
1
6
Because there is no usable French hours series, we carried out a somewhat
different exercise for France, asking how much larger measured employment
adjustment would have been had employers made layoffs to achieve the hours
15. Additional details concerning our procedures for constructing time series on West German
production workers' short-time hours are reported in Abraham and Houseman (1993).
16. Results estimated using data for more disaggregated manufacturing industries confirm the
importance of the role played by short time in West German hours adjustment.82 Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman
reductions accomplished through short time. The French report quarterly data
on the full-time equivalent number of days of authorized short time. We di-
vided these numbers by sixty-five to yield a full-time employment equivalent
usage measure and constructed a labor input series by subtracting this number
of employees from the actual employment series. We then fit labor adjustment
models, using both actual employment and this adjusted employment series
to construct our dependent variable. Like the results for West Germany,
the French results reported in table 3.4 indicate that the use of short time
makes an important contribution to the adjustment of labor input. In particu-
lar, the results imply that the median and the mean adjustment lags for em-
ployment would fall by over half if .ayoffs were used in lieu of short-time
work. By implication, in the short run, short-time work is a more important
mechanism for adjusting labor input than is the adjustment of employment
levels.
For Belgium, we were able to obtain monthly data on the number of full-
time equivalent persons on short time for the aggregate economy. Although we
did not have monthly short-time data disaggregated by sector, we did have data
on the proportion of short-time work accounted for by manufacturing for two
years. To construct a quarterly short-time hours series for Belgian manufactur-
ing, we multiplied the short-time hours series for the aggregate economy by
0.475, the average of the proportion of short-time hours accounted for by man-
ufacturing in 1985 and 1990, and aggregated the monthly data to yield quar-
terly figures. As was done for West Germany, we then added the short-time
hours to production hours and estimated our standard hours adjustment equa-
tion with this series.
As table 3.4 shows, the results of this exercise are quite similar to those for
West Germany and show that short-time hours make an important contribution
to total hours adjustment in Belgium. Because the manufacturing sector is
somewhat more cyclical than the aggregate economy, our estimates, if any-
thing, understate the importance of short time in Belgian manufacturing
hours adjustment.
3.4 Have Dismissal Laws Inhibited Labor Market Flexibility?
As already noted, we are particularly interested in whether the changes in
job-security regulations in West Germany, France, and Belgium during the
1970s and 1980s affected the speed with which labor input adjusted to changes
in output. By making it easier to reduce work force levels during periods of
slack demand, argued proponents of weaker regulation, such changes also
would make employers more willing to hire during periods of rising demand.
There is, however, little empirical evidence on this issue.
To support their claims, proponents of weaker job-security regulation often
appealed to employer surveys of the sort summarized in table 3.5. The em-83 Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?
Table 3.5 Selected Results from a 1985 European Community Survey of
Manufacturing Employers"
United
Response West Germany France Belgium Kingdom
/. Insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding labor as an obstacle to more employment
Very important 23% 48% 38% 7%
Important 33 33 37 19
Not important 39 15 25 58
No answer 5 4 0 16
2. Expected effects on employment plans over next twelve months of shorter periods of





















































4. Expected effects on employment plans over next twelve months of reduction in


























"Survey methodology and results summarized in Commission of the European Communities,
European Economy, no. 27, March 1986.
ployer responses reported there are based on a survey conducted by the Com-
mission of the European Communities in 1985. Over half of manufacturing
employers in each of the three European countries we are studying cited "in-
sufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding of labor" as a very important or
important obstacle to increased employment. The percentage is particularly
large (81 percent) in France, where at that point in time employers who wanted
to dismiss workers were required to obtain the authorization of the Labor In-
spectorate. Many manufacturing employers, particularly in West Germany and
Belgium, believed that shorter notice periods, enhanced possibilities for using
temporary workers, and lower severance payments would have a significant
positive effect on their hiring plans. Comparable figures for the United King-
dom, where job-security regulations are much less stringent, are also reported84 Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman
to provide a point of reference. Not surprisingly, U.K. employers who re-
sponded to the survey were much less likely to cite hiring and firing rigidities
as a barrier to employment.
1
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Our approach to assessing the effects of legal changes is to look for changes
in the pace of labor adjustment that might have accompanied the introduction
of more or less stringent regulations. For West Germany, we ask whether the
speed of adjustment changed following passage of the Employment Promotion
Act in 1985.
1
8 That law raised the number of employees who could be laid off
without an employer being required to negotiate a social plan with the works
council. It also liberalized the use of fixed-term contracts. The nature of these
changes suggests that the responsiveness of employment to changes in output
might have risen following the law's passage. To the extent that employers had
not fully compensated for the slower adjustment of employment with the faster
adjustment of average hours per worker, we also might expect that the weaken-
ing of employment protection laws would be accompanied by more rapid ad-
justment of total labor input.
Modified versions of equation (1) can be used to assess the effect of changes
in labor market regulation on the speed with which labor inputs are adjusted.
For example, to test whether the 1985 Employment Promotion Act raised the
speed of labor adjustment in West Germany we estimate:
(2) lnL, = a0 + a,D85:2 + (l-\0-\lDS5:2)<\>\nPl +
(K0+\lDS5:2)\nLl^l + 8,/ + 8/ + e,,
where D85:2 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one in all quarters from
1985:2 onward and a value of zero prior to that date. The results of this test are
reported in the three parts of table 3.6: total employment (panel A), production
employment (panel B), and production hours (panel C). Had employment be-
come more responsive, we would have expected negative values for X,; the
estimated values vary in sign, though with one exception the coefficients are
insignificant. Our finding that passage of the 1985 Employment Promotion Act
did not raise the speed of employment adjustment is consistent with that of




In France, the major change in dismissal regulation that we are able to study
is the elimination in 1987 of the requirement that the Labor Inspectorate autho-
17. The responses to a similar survey of European employers in the retail trade sector show
much the same pattern.
18. The West German data series that we use in the present paper begin in 1970 and thus in
principle would permit us to test the effects of the social plan requirement introduced by the Works
Constitution Act of 1972. However, the results of any test based on data containing only eight pre-
1972 observations would be highly suspect.
19. The Works Constitution Act of 1972 changed West German job-security regulations more
fundamentally than did the Employment Promotion Act of 1985. The 1972 act's requirement that
employers who carry out a collective dismissal must negotiate a social plan with the works council
might have been expected to slow employers' adjustment to changing economic conditions. In
earlier research using a somewhat different approach, however, we found no evidence that this
occurred (Abraham and Houseman 1993).85 Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?
rize all dismissals of two or more workers.
2
0 Particularly given the large pro-
portion of French employers who reported in 1985 that insufficient flexibility
in the hiring and shedding of labor was a major obstacle to employment, it is
plausible that this legal change would have had an important effect on the pace
of employment adjustment. Again, however, our findings offer no strong sup-
port for this position.
If weaker job-security regulations encourage more rapid employment ad-
justment, we would expect negative values of X, in the employment adjustment
models reported for France in panel A of table 3.6. Although the estimated
value of X, is negative and significant for three of seven disaggregated indus-
tries, this result obtains neither for manufacturing as a whole nor for the re-
maining four disaggregated industries. We interpret these results as providing
no more than weak support for the view that the weakening of French dismissal
regulations has increased the speed of employment adjustment.
Although changes to dismissal law were less dramatic in Belgium than in
the other two countries, significant reforms were introduced in 1976 and 1985.
A royal decree in 1975, effective at the start of 1976, imposed the requirement
that employers who make collective dismissals must notify the government
thirty to sixty days in advance of carrying them out. In 1985 a package of
reforms loosened employment regulations in a variety of ways. We would ex-
pect, therefore, that adjustment speeds would have fallen following the imposi-
tion of the 1975 royal decree (X, positive in the models reported in table 3.6)
and risen following the 1985 reforms (X2 negative in those same models). In
certain of the Belgian equations, particularly those with the logarithm of total
employment as the dependent variable, we obtain small estimates of Xo and
large estimates of X,. This pattern probably is attributable to the fact that we
have only twelve quarterly observations prior to the introduction of the 1976
reforms. Leaving these cases aside, our results offer no consistent support for
the view that legislative changes have produced important changes in adjust-
ment speeds. Our findings concerning the lack of any effect of the 1975 decree
are consistent with those of Van Audenrode (1991), who fit separate adjust-
ment equations using 1965-75 data and 1976-86 data and found no evidence
of a change in the estimated model parameters between the two time periods.
Taken as a whole, then, our results provide no strong evidence that changes
in the strength of job-security regulations since the early 1970s affected the
speed of labor adjustment in West Germany, France, or Belgium. Various inter-
pretations of this finding are possible. One could argue that the regulatory
changes we have identified did not fundamentally change the relevant legal
framework or that the constraints imposed by collective bargaining agreements
are more important than those imposed by the laws we have considered, so that
20. Given that French data are available from the last quarter of 1972 onward, we could have
reported tests of the effects of the 1975 introduction of the requirement that employers receive
authorization for all dismissals. The results of this test, however, were implausible, presumably
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legal changes had only limited effects. In the French context, these arguments
do not seem plausible. There is widespread agreement that the elimination of
the requirement for government approval of layoffs in France was an important
change. Although the post-1972 changes in West German and Belgian dis-
missal regulation were less fundamental, observers in both countries have
viewed the changes as significant.
In addition, although there is no clear theoretical reason for the Koyck ad-
justment coefficients we have estimated to be affected by differences in de-
mand conditions, it is possible that our findings are contaminated by the differ-
ent aggregate economic conditions of the 1970s and 1980s. Cleaner tests of the
effects of different regulatory regimes may become possible if the European
countries experience a deep downturn of the sort produced by the first oil price
shock in the mid-1970s. In some cases, we also have relatively few observa-
tions either before or following a major change in legislation, thus raising the
standard errors and lowering the significance of the coefficients capturing the
effects of the change. In the future, with a longer time series it may be possible
to construct a stronger test of the effects of the more recent legal changes.
Perhaps the most intriguing interpretation of our findings is that the changes
to job-security regulations in West Germany, France, and Belgium during the
1970s and 1980s had little effect because employers had adapted to a strong
job-security regime by using alternate adjustment mechanisms that have gener-
ally proved to be satisfactory and that they feel no compelling need to change.
This interpretation is consistent with our earlier findings that the speed of
hours adjustment, at least in Germany and Belgium, is more similar to that in
the United States than is the speed of employment adjustment and that the
availability of short-time compensation facilitates hours adjustment in these
countries.
3.5 Conclusion
Our results suggest that, at least under certain circumstances, strong job se-
curity is compatible with labor market flexibility. Although the adjustment of
employment to changes in output is much slower in the German, French, and
Belgian manufacturing sectors than in the U.S. manufacturing sector, the ad-
justment of hours worked appears to be much more similar. Further support
for the view that job-security regulations have not been burdensome for em-
ployers in the three countries we have studied comes from the fact that seem-
ingly important changes in these regulations have not led to measurably differ-
ent adjustment. A plausible interpretation of this finding is that, in spite of
the important constraints imposed upon their behavior by existing job-security
regulations, employers in these countries have developed alternate strategies
that have given them adequate flexibility to adjust their labor input to changes
in output.
Compared to the United States, then, labor market institutions in the Euro-89 Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?
pean countries we have studied seem to have encouraged relatively greater
reliance on hours adjustment and correspondingly reduced reliance on hiring
and firing to alter the level of employment. This finding raises the question of
how the competing systems we have examined should be evaluated.
Although the use of short time and temporary layoffs during a cyclical
downturn may be reasonably close substitutes from the employer's point of
view, they are quite different from the employee's perspective. Workers on tem-
porary layoff are likely to face considerable uncertainty about whether they
will ever be recalled. Those who are never recalled experience longer than
average unemployment spells, in part because they tend not to look for new
work while awaiting recall. These lengthy spells of unemployment represent a
loss of income for the individual workers and a loss of resources to society.
Extensive reliance on layoffs is also less equitable than work-sharing, for it
concentrates the costs of adjustment on a relatively small number of workers
who suffer large losses of income and other job-related benefits. Short-time
work arrangements spread the costs of adjustment more evenly across mem-
bers of the work force. These are important arguments in favor of short-time
work to accommodate cyclical fluctuations in demand.
Short-time work may be used to accommodate structural as well as cyclical
downturns. By extending the time over which these work force reductions oc-
cur, employers can make greater use of attrition and other alternatives to layoff.
The use of short-time work in instances of structural adjustment is more con-
troversial. Economists typically take the position that in the event of a perma-
nent decline in demand, workers should be reallocated to other sectors as
quickly as possible. To achieve this, large-scale layoffs, where necessary, have
been advocated, on the assumption that dislocated workers will then be forced
to find new employment. A number of recent studies of displaced workers in
the United States show, however, that workers permanently laid off from their
jobs often experience long periods of unemployment (see, for example, Podg-
ursky and Swaim 1987, or Seitchik and Zornitsky 1989). By using short-time
work as an interim adjustment measure and relying on attrition to reduce work
force levels, firms can significantly reduce or even avoid layoffs. In this way,
job reductions occur among those who have the most attractive outside oppor-
tunities or who are best able to relocate, and those who have poor outside op-
portunities or who are unable to relocate are not thrown out of work.
Currently, seventeen states in the United States have short-time compensa-
tion programs, but data show that in these states short-time compensation is
used relatively little compared to regular unemployment insurance. The rea-
sons for this low take-up rate are not entirely clear. One factor no doubt is that
U.S. law makes it relatively easy for employers to lay off workers. Because
there are no significant legal obstacles to continued reliance on layoffs, U.S.
employers arguably have no compelling incentive to rethink their established
adjustment strategies. Certain aspects of the way in which existing U.S. short-
time programs have been administered also may have discouraged the use of90 Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman
short-time benefits.
2
1 For example, in contrast to Europe, where short-time
payments are financed either through a non-experience-rated payroll tax or
through general tax revenues, short-time benefits in the United States are fi-
nanced through an experience-rated payroll tax, which may discourage their
use. In addition, the maintenance of health care benefits for employed workers
may be more of a disincentive to the use of short time in the United States than
in Europe.
2
2 Whether and how U.S. employers should be encouraged to make
greater use of short time remain important unanswered questions.
Appendix
Figure 3.1 and the estimates reported in tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.6 make use of
seasonally adjusted quarterly data on output, employment, production employ-
ment, and production hours, as available for each of the four countries included
in the study.
For all four countries, the principal output measure is an index of industrial
production (IPI). The German IPI is based on employer reports concerning the
output of some 10,000 product groups. For France, 45 percent of the underly-
ing series is based on production measured in physical units, 13 percent on
input quantities, 18 percent on deflated turnover, 18 percent on hours worked,
5 percent on raw materials consumed, and 1 percent on orders converted into
production. The Belgian IPI is based primarily on physical production data,
but in metal working, which receives a weight of about 30 percent in the con-
struction of the total manufacturing index, movements in deflated turnover and
in hours worked serve as equal proxies for movements in output. Where avail-
able, information on physical output serves as the basis for the IPI for the
United States. Information on energy usage is generally the preferred proxy
for the level of production activity where output data are unavailable, but in
some cases worker hours serve as a production activity proxy. The IPIs for the
three European countries were obtained on tape from Eurostat, the Statistical
Office of the European Community, and the U.S. IPI data are published by the
Federal Reserve Board. We also make limited use of deflated shipments series
for the United States. The U.S. shipments data were obtained from the Bureau
of the Census's Manufacturer's Shipments, Inventories, and Orders data set and
were deflated using, as appropriate, the manufacturing, durable goods, or non-
durable goods producer price index.
21. See Abraham and Houseman (1993) for a more detailed discussion.
22. At least in Germany, however, special provisions concerning the maintenance of social in-
surance contributions as well as collective bargaining agreement provisions concerning vacation
time and other special payments to workers imply that the fixed costs of keeping a worker on the
payroll are substantial (Flechsenhar 1978, Abraham and Houseman 1993). These costs have not
prevented German employers from making substantial use of the short-time system.91 Does Employment Protection Inhibit Labor Market Flexibility?
Monthly data on West German employment, production employment, and
production hours were obtained directly from the Statistisches Bundesamt. Be-
cause employment is measured at the end of the month in Germany, rather than
at midmonth as in the United States, we transformed the German employment
numbers, defining:
(Al)
These transformed numbers were used in all analyses, though making this ad-
justment had little effect on any of our estimates. The West German hours
numbers measure actual hours worked during the course of the month. For
France, we used quarterly employment indices supplied by Eurostat. French
production employment data are not available; although French hours data are
published, they are not comparable over time. Eurostat supplied us with indices
of employment, production employment, and production hours for Belgium.
The Eurostat figures for Belgium are quarterly for the pre-1980 period and
monthly from 1980 onward; to ensure comparability over time, the later figures
were converted to quarterly numbers before seasonally adjusting. Belgian la-
bor data for the manufacturing sector as a whole were reported by Eurostat
only from 1980 onward; complete quarterly series on manufacturing employ-
ment, production employment, and production hours were obtained from Jean
Lemaitre of Lou vain University. The Belgian employment numbers refer to
employment as of the pay period including the fifteenth of the month; the Bel-
gian hours numbers measure hours worked during the month. The U.S. em-
ployment and hours data are monthly numbers published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The U.S. employment figures refer to payroll employment as
of the payroll period including the twelfth of the month; the U.S. hours num-
bers measure hours paid during the same period.
None of the four countries' employment or hours series is adjusted for the
effects of strikes. In cases where we knew that large strikes had occurred (e.g.,
in the West German automobile industry in 1984), we included dummy vari-
ables for the affected periods in our estimating equations.
In addition to the data just described, the estimates reported in table 3.4
required data on hours of short-time compensation. For West Germany, the
underlying data are monthly figures on the number of workers in the manufac-
turing sector collecting short-time payments, and annual data on the distribu-
tion of workers collecting short-time payments according to the percentage
reduction in their hours of work. These numbers were taken from Amtliche
Nachrichten der Bundesanstaltfiir Arbeit—Jahreszahlen (various issues), pub-
lished by the Bundesanstalt fiir Arbeit. For France, monthly data by industry
on the number of full-time equivalent days of authorized short-time compensa-
tion are reported in Statistiques du Travail: Bulletin Mensuel, published by the
Ministere des Affaires Sociales et de l'Emploi. We received unpublished data
on short-time payments in Belgium, expressed in terms of the full-time equiva-92 Katharine G. Abraham and Susan N. Houseman
lent number of workers supported, from Dirk de Bie of the Office Nationale
de l'Emploi.
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